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INTRODUCTION

Among International Commercial Arbitration ("ICA") specialists,
the suggestion that recent years have been eventful would likely pass
without objection. In the Anglo-American context alone there have4
3
occurred important decisions, legislative proposals to limit arbitration,
and the launching of an American Law Institute Restatement on ICA.5
These developments have punctuated a period already made memorable
by events marking the fiftieth anniversary of the New York Convention.6
The latter treaty has long been the centerpiece of the regime that makes
arbitration the preferred alternative to litigation for transnational
commercial disputes,7 and a symbol of what can be accomplished on a
multilateral basis. For the new entrant in the field, however, an
appreciation of these and similar matters requires context. A book
recently introduced by Cambridge University Press seeks to supply that
context:
The Principles and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitrationby Professor Margaret L. Moses.8
The book aims to provide-at an attractive price-a
comprehensive survey of the more important topics associated with the
theory and practice of ICA. It comprises 340 pages (100 pages of which
is devoted to its ten documentary appendices). 1 °
A first chapter

3. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008); infra notes
84-85 and accompanying text; the House of Lords decision in Premium Nafta Products
Ltd., & Others v. Fili Shipping Co., Ltd., & others (Fiona Trust & Holding Corp., &
others v. Yuri Privalov & Others), [2007] UKHL 40 (U.K.); see also MOSES, supra note
1, at 90 (discussing English Court of Appeals decision); infra notes 64-68 and
accompanying text.
4. See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Arbitration: If the FAA
"Ain't Broke, " Don't Fix It, 63 Bus. LAW. 907 (2008); Mark Kantor, Legislative
ProposalsCould Significantly Alter Arbitration in the United States, 74 ARB. 444 (2008).
5. See Council OKs Draftsfor Annual Meeting, Approves InternationalArbitration
Project, 30(2) ALI REP. (Winter 2008), available at http://www.ali.org/_news/
reporter/winter2008/3_InterArbitration.htm; cf Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration
Penumbra: ArbitrationLaw and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution,
8 NEV. L.J. 427, 469-70 (2007) (pre-approval investigation); see also George A.
Bermann, Jack J. Coe, Jr., Christopher R. Drahozal, & Catherine A. Rogers, Restating the
U.S. Law of InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
(2009).
6. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517; Symposia include: The New York Convention: 50 Years,
2(1) Disp. RESOL. INT'L 1 (2008) [hereinafter 50 Years].
7. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
8. MOSES, supra note 1.
9. The paperback's price is £16.99 ($29.99); the hardback lists for £45.00 ($90.00).
See http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521685627.
10. The ten, in the order of their appearance, are: Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, arts. I-XVI, 21 U.S.T 2517
[New York Convention]; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
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introduces ICA, the attributes that have sustained it, and the leading
institutions that support it. Chapters two and three address the arbitration
agreement with an emphasis on enforcement and drafting. Chapter four
treats sources of law and important tenets of conflicts of law specific to
international arbitration. Chapter five covers the role of the courts, and
Chapter six-the tribunal. Arbitral proceedings are surveyed in Chapter
seven. Chapters eight through ten are devoted to the award: its form,
vulnerability to attack, and enforcement. A final chapter surveys
investment arbitration. 11
Whether a teacher or a practitioner, one might be forgiven for
asking whether another arbitration reference is to be welcomed. In
contrast to a former time when teaching ICA meant assembling materials
from scratch (or for the practitioner--consulting perhaps Domke 12 or
Mustill & Boyd 1 3), at present there is an abundant supply of books on14
arbitration, many for classroom use and many in advanced editions.
Arbitration, adopted by The United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade, U.N. Doc. A/40/17,
June 21, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985); Revised Articles of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), availableat http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf;
UNCITRAL Recommendation
Regarding the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2 and Article VII, Paragraph I of the
New York Convention, availableat http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
NY-conv/A2E.pdf; IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial
Arbitration,
June 1, 1999, available at http://www.asser.nl/ica/documents/
cms_ica_4_1_IBAROE2.pdf; IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators 1987
reprinted in IBA, Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2004),
available at www.ibanet.org; ABA, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes Canon It (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercialdisputes.pdf.
11. The book is also designed to make information accessible: the book's index and
table of contents are thorough, and the work is logically ordered and arranged in headings
and sub-headings that are descriptive and non-fanciful. The book is available in
paperback and hard-bound versions. At approximately 7" x 10" x 1", the paperback
version I consulted is wonderfully portable. It has the feel of Redfern and Hunter's
Student Edition or of William Fox's, International Commercial Agreements: A
FunctionalPrimeron DraftingNegotiatingand Resolving Disputes (3d ed. 1998) (4th ed.
forthcoming 2008/2009). It is thus more treatise-like than George Bermann's rightly
popular TransnationalLitigation in a Nutshell (2003).
12. MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2008).
13. MICHAEL MUSTILL & STEWART BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1989)
(English law).
14. Examples include: KLAUS PETER BERGER, ARBITRATION INTERACTIVE (2002);
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 2008); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION (4th ed. 2007); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005); CHRISTOPHER DRAHOZAL,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CASES AND PROBLEMS (2002); STEPHEN K. HUBER & E.
WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER, ARBITRATION CASES AND MATERIALS (1999); ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2005); MICHAEL
REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND
NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES (1997); TIBOR
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The blossoming array of texts is of course market-induced.
For
international commercial disputes, arbitration is first among equals, a
fact reflected in empirical studies canvassing multinational corporations 5
and evidenced by the large number of
arbitration practice groups now
16
maintained by international law firms.
Certainly one justification for introducing another book on
arbitration is to fill a niche, and to do it well. The fact that Professor
Moses has done this is best appreciated when considering the significant
challenge placed before her: with developments in the field unfolding at
a steady pace, the goal was to present in a fresh, portable, form a good
sense of the field at large, while striking a sensible balance between
detail and coverage and achieving an apt mixture of evergreen issues,
immutable principles, and broad trends. The following brief tour
d'horizon suggests many of the areas of inquiry illuminated through the
book's thoughtful selection and treatment of topics and should also
indicate why we who specialize in this field find it to be one of perennial
richness.
II.

SELECTED BENCHMARKS CHARACTERIZING THE

A.

Statutory and ProceduralUnification

ICA MILEAU

The past three decades have seen developments fostering unification
in expectations about arbitral procedures and, perhaps in equal measure,
the development of global standards delineating the proper relationship
between courts and arbitrators. Among the more significant formulae

VARADY, JoHN J. BARCEL6, III, & ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2009); RUSSELL J.

WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (5th ed., Carolina Academic

Press 2006).
15.

See GERRY LAGERBERG & LOUKAS MISTELIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:

CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 5 (2006) (73% of survey companies prefer to use
international arbitration rather than courts, but usually in combination with non-arbitral
ADR).
16. Current law school curricula and related programs reflect the practical
importance of arbitration in an interdependent world. In international arbitration, as
distinct from its domestic cousin, speed and cost are less important than neutrality of
location and process (the need to avoid domestic courts); the global enforceability of
awards through treaties is also of paramount importance. With international law firms
seeming to compete as never before for the significant arbitration work being generated
by globalization, ICA and related courses have become relatively common. Certificate
and LL.M. programs that offer students specialization in international arbitration are no
longer novel and the leading international arbitration moot competition has become so
popular that a Hong Kong version of that competition was inaugurated to absorb some of
the demand and to complement the Vienna-based original.
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informing these trends have been the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 17
the IBA Evidence Rules, I8 and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Published
in 1985, the latter model statute has been adopted in over sixty
jurisdictions (including several U.S. States).' 9 Its attributes 20 reveal a
number of animating principles common to ICA: the effectiveness of
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, wide party autonomy in configuring
the proceedings, wide discretion in arbitral tribunals to conduct the
proceedings in default of contrary party agreements, limited court
involvement in the proceedings, and limits on court control of awards
(characterized in particular by the absence of merits review and narrow
21
conceptions of public policy).
Ultimately, the confidence necessary to pursue the Model Law and
its subsequent success must be attributed in large part to the trail blazed
by the Model Law's 1976 older cousin-the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules.22 Though not a model statute, that text not only made the decision
17. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, art. 34, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17,
U.N.Doc.A/3 1/17(1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/
arbitration.html.
18. IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in InternationalCommercial Arbitration,
supra note 10.
19. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and list of
adherent
states, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/
arbitration/ 1985Modelarbitration.html.
20. See Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on Int'l Commercial
Arbitration: Report of Secretary General (A/CN.9/ 264), XVI Y.B. U.N. Comm'n Int'l
Trade L. (1985), in BROWER ET AL., infra note 108, at 2. A leading reference on the
Model Law is HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 920-22 (1989).

21. The Model Law's introduction in 1986 was thought by many to be relevant
largely to countries with outdated arbitration laws yet modest access to drafting expertise.
Today, far from being a template associated with less developed countries, the Model
Law has assumed prominence as a leading influence on arbitration law in states of all
sorts; its adopting jurisdictions include: California, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Scotland,
Sweden, Texas and many other systems not associated with underdeveloped stores of
legislative expertise; and its influence can be readily seen in the English Arbitration Act
of 1996. See DEPARTMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION LAW, REPORT ON
THE ARBITRATION BILL 5-7 (February 1996) (in preparation close attention was paid to

the Model Law). Evidencing the wisdom of its architects in not trying to do too much,
and having been pressed into service in so many jurisdictions (often with modifications)
the Model Law was bound to be revisited with an eye toward possible refinements. See
Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf, at 23. Unlike widely adopted treaties, such as
the New York Convention, that cannot be so easily refined to meet modern needs, a
model statute can be revised and offered to lawmakers on an individual basis. In the case
of the Model Law, recent amendments have addressed, inter alia, the details associated
with tribunal grants of interim measures.
22. See, e.g., Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, art. 34, supra note 17.
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to arbitrate without an institution much more feasible than before, but
provided institutional drafters with a highly serviceable template with
which to craft their own rules, once it became apparent that the
UNCITRAL text represented a modem standard of sorts. Within a few
years of the Rules' publication, they had been adopted by the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal 23 and contemporaneously by numerous institutions
seeking to emulate an internationally accepted model.24 The Rules have
guided not only nearly thirty years of Iran-Claims Tribunal proceedings,
but have governed perhaps hundreds of ad hoc proceedings.25
Neither the UNCITRAL Rules nor the Model Law address in detail
the sometimes thorny questions of evidence 26 and related problems of
document disclosure and document exchange. 7 International arbitration

23.

Many books have been written about the Tribunal. Among the better ones are
N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
(1998), and GEORGE ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS

CHARLES
TRIBUNAL
TRIBUNAL

(1996).
Useful collections of essays include: THE IRAN- U.S. CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL AT TWENTY FIVE (Christopher Drahozal & Christopher Gibson eds., 2007);
THE IRAN-UNITED

STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL

CLAIMS RESOLUTION 283 (David Caron & John Crook eds., 2000). When adopting the

UNCITRAL Rules, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was yet in its infancy, and the
UNCITRAL Rules themselves were relatively new. Lucy Reed, formerly of the U.S.
State Department and once posted to The Hague, would later remark: "I cannot
emphasize enough how important it was that the Tribunal started with a suitable and clear
set of procedural rules." Institutionaland ProceduralAspects of Mass Claims Settlement
Systems: The Iran-United State Claims Tribunal, in PCA, INSTITUTIONAL AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MASS CLAIMS SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 9, 12 (2000). The

expansive caseload and longevity of the Tribunal meant that it would perform a sustained
test of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and give rise to substantial practice under them.
See generally DAVID CARON ET AL., THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (2006);
JACOMIJN J. VAN HOF, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (1991); see

also Stewart Baker & Mark Davis, Arbitral Proceedings under the UNCITRAL RulesThe Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 267, 347 (1989-1990).
24. Published in 1976, those rules have proven serviceable, so much so that they are
essential to understanding the origins of most institutional rules, and the revisions likely
to emerge from UNCITRAL's present study of them will not likely represent a
repudiation of their basic structure and underlying philosophy.
25. Not least among circumstances tending to press the UNCITRAL Rules into
service has been their designation in perhaps thousands of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs), typically as the sole alternative to ICSID arbitration.
26. Charles Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals: The Need for Some
Standard Rules, 28 INT'L LAW. 47, 49 (1994); Martin Hunter, Modern Trends in the
Presentationof Evidence in InternationalCommercial, 3 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 204, 204
(1992).
27. The term "discovery" is resisted by most specialists since it is specific to AngloAmerican systems and misleading in that the exchanges that occur in international
arbitration are voluntary unless ordered by the tribunal and, ordinarily, do not approach
federal style discovery in scope. Proposals to pursue discovery as practiced in England
and the United States are typically not enthusiastically received by civil law lawyers and
arbitrators.
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naturally brings into potential conflict expectations born of different
legal traditions. 28 These divergent approaches are particularly manifest
in pre-trial practices related to fact-finding. Without the aid of some
mediating regime, a civil law lawyer is unlikely to take as her default
premise that there should occur obligatory pre-arbitration exchanges of
documents between adverse parties, replies to interrogatories, or
depositions (all techniques in what an American lawyer would call
"discovery"). 29 Indeed, while some form of cross-examination of
witnesses often occurs in international arbitration, it is because regular
participants from civil law backgrounds have come to accept it for
purposes of arbitral proceedings, regardless of its absence in their
domestic legal systems.30
Nor do concordant rules of witness preparation or of privilege exist
across domestic legal systems. 31 The flexibility of the arbitral method of
course has allowed experienced arbitrators and counsel to craft for each
proceeding a via media. Over time, a collection of the best practices has
emerged32 that has shaped and reinforced expectations.3 3 In the hands of

28. See generally Christian Borris, Common Law and Civil Law: Fundamental
Differences and Their Impact on Arbitration, ARB. DIsp. RESOL. J. 78 (1995); Siegfried
Elsing & John Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law Divide, 18 ARB. INT'L
59 (2002); Paul Friedland, Combining Civil Law and Common Law Elements in the
Presentation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, 12(9) MEALEY'S
INT'L ARO. REP. 25 (1997); Andreas Lowenfeld, The Two-Way Mirror: International
Arbitration as ComparativeProcedure, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L STUD. 163 (1985).
29. Although wide-ranging discovery as practiced in U.S. Federal courts is not the
norm in international arbitration, if the parties agree, they may submit to an analogous
regime of their own design.
See KLAUS BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ARBITRATION 430-31(Springer 1993); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 11, at 30-34; cf
MOSES, supra note 1, at 170 ("Depositions are almost never allowed, unless both parties
have agreed to them.").
30. See MOSES, supra note 1, at 170; cf IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 10, art. 8(2) (following direct
testimony, other parties may question a witness "in an order to be determined by the
tribunal").
31. See generally MOSES, supra note 1, at 171; Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg,
Evidentiary Privileges in InternationalArbitration, 50 INT'L COMPAR. L.Q. 345 (2001).
One recurrent problem with respect to privilege is that the communications of in-house
counsel are not privileged in many legal systems. See Val Davies et al., Legal Privilege
Under European Community Law in Light of the 2007 Decision in Akzo Nobel
Chemicals Limited and Akcros Chemical Limited v. The Commission, in INT'L LITIG.
NEWS 19 (2008). The divergent rules make for pivotal but often difficult choice of law
determinations.
32. See generally Hans Smit, Managing an International Arbitration: An
Arbitrator's View, 5 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 129 (1994); Alan Rau & Edward Sherman,
Tradition and Innovation in InternationalArbitration Procedure,30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89
(1995); Karl Heinz B6ckstiegel, Major Criteriafor InternationalArbitrators in Shaping
an Efficient Procedure,in ARBITRATION INTHE NEXT DECADE, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL.
SPEC. SuPP., at 49 (1999).
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experts, these modes of operating can be explained in writing,
The principal
undergoing further refinement in the process.
accomplishment of this type is the above-mentioned IBA Rules on
Evidence in Arbitration. 34 Along with other guides, 35 the IBA Evidence
Rules have, in Professor Moses's terms, a "harmonizing" influence on
international arbitral procedure.
What one calls procedural unification, of course, another might call
an unwelcome drift toward litigation-like, common law procedures, a
trend sometimes pejoratively referred to as the "Americanization" of
ICA. 37 Certainly, there is a constant tension between the litigator's
desire for familiar methods and arbitration's claim that it can offer
Undoubtedly, the problem has been
relative speed and agility.
exacerbated by the advent of "E-discovery," which has inevitably
become just another potentially contentious element in a tribunal's
management of the proceedings.38

33. These are not so much exclusive techniques as they are a number of accepted
variations on a general approach.
34. See generally V.V. Veeder, Evidential Rules in International Commercial
Arbitration:From the Tower of London to the New 1999 IBA Rules, 65 ARB. 291 (1999);
Michael Buhler & Carroll Dorgan, Witness Testimony Pursuant to the IBA Rules of
Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration-Novel or Tested Standards?, 17 J.
INT'L ARB. 3, 12-13, 15 (2000). The IBA Rules apply when the parties designate them or
when the arbitrators, in their discretion, determine that they will be guided by them.
Although the IBA Rules have been influential, that text's constituent rules are often relied
upon piecemeal, rather than through adoption of the text as a whole.
35. See UNCITRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS, U.N. Comm'n
on Int'l Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/17 (1996), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes-e.pdf (checklist for planning
arbitrations); ICC Commission Report, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in
Arbitration (2007); ICDR Guidelines for Arbitrators Concerning Exchanges of
Information, availableat http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5288.
36. MOSES, supra note 1, at 165.
37. See generally WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
DISPUTES 8-9 (2006); cf Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International
Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69 (2003) (discussing also positive
contributions).
38. Several institutions are studying the E-discovery challenge, and some have
issued guidelines. See Fulbright & Jaworski, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Protocol
for E-Disclosure in Arbitration, 2 INT'L ARB. REP. 15 (2008). For a somewhat datedbut still very useful-survey of techniques for maximizing arbitration's potential, see
Howard M. Holtzmann, Balancingthe Need for Certainty and Flexibility in International
Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 12-13 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N.
Brower eds., 1993). The ICDR recently published guidance aimed at subduing
expectations that international commercial arbitration should have all the trappings of
litigation.

B.

1377

BOOK REVIEW

2009]

Arbitral Competency

While in no legal system are the powers of arbitrators and courts
coextensive, the recognized subject matter and remedial competency of
arbitrators has become considerable. In the United States, the train of
essential decisions began in 1972 with the U.S. Supreme Court's forum
selection decision in Bremen v. Zapata39 and continued apace as subject

matter

reserves

favoring

the

judiciary

underwent

persistent

reconsideration and, correspondingly, party autonomy came to enjoy a
more central and powerful function. Under the resulting jurisprudence,
provided there exists an arbitration clause of sufficient scope, an
arbitrator may adjudicate both garden variety tort claims and statutory
claims of most kinds.40 This is true even though the arbitrators in
question might not have received their legal training in the United States,
may have been instructed to conduct the arbitration abroad, and will
apply-at least in part-the foreign law designated in the contract (a
pattern many will recognize as the watershed Mitsubishi case). 4 1 In the
process of adjudicating public law claims, moreover, arbitrators are in
appropriate cases entitled to, and indeed perhaps expected to, 42 award
remedies having a penal flavor, such as punitive damages and statutory
treble damages, 43 and may also grant anti-suit injunctions and other
44
injunctive relief.

39. The Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
40. Relying on robust pro-arbitration policies attributed to the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), several United States Supreme Court decisions have confirmed that a broad
range of statutory matters may be arbitrated. Under the FAA, the following have been
found to be arbitrable: federal age discrimination claims in the employment context,
Gilmer v. Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991); state discrimination
and related tort claims in the employment context, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 121 (2001); Sherman Act claims, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985); federal securities claims, both under the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513 (1974),
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987), and under the Securities Act
of 1933, Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) overruling
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 485-86 (1953); federal "racketeering" claims: claims
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), McMahon, 482
U.S. at 242, and claims under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros v. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995).
41. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629-40.
42. Cf Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-08 (2003)
(enforcement of arbitration agreement will not be denied merely because arbitrator might
construe agreement to preclude awards of treble damages).
43. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (if parties
agree to include a claim for punitive damages, FAA ensures state law prohibition of
punitive damages in arbitration will not have effect). Indeed, contractual attempts to
restrict a tribunal's power to award multiple damages under a statute otherwise
contemplating such a remedy may be invalid. Cf Pacificare,538 U.S., at 406-08 (issue
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So too has substantial authority confirmed an arbitral tribunal's
power to determine its own jurisdiction 45 and, significantly, under certain
circumstances to do so with relative preclusiveness in particular
jurisdictions. 46 This principle-the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrineinteracts with the "severability" principle to forestall maneuvers that
could otherwise render international arbitration ineffectual. 47
C.

The Courts as Gatekeepers and Enforcers-ArbitratorJurisdiction
and Control of A wards

A canvassing of arbitration case databases will readily confirm that,
overwhelmingly, arbitration comes before judges with respect to two
issues: the enforcement of putative agreements to arbitrate, and requests
to vacate awards (typically coincident to cross-petitions to confirm
them).
With respect to the first, the two-part inquiry is the same in most
legal systems:
does the arbitration agreement exist, and does it
encompass the dispute in question? The answer to the first questionwhether there exists an agreement to arbitrate-is what distinguishes an
arbitrator from an officious volunteer. Though in some legal systems
not reached as Court would not assume arbitrator would refrain from granting statutorily
authorized exemplary damages).
44. See Rintin Corp. v. Domar, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11 th Cir. 2007); Telnor
Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 332, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
45. See MOSES, supra note 1, at 88-92. The doctrine's reception into mainstream
arbitration jurisprudence is helpfully traced in Richard Hulbert, Institutional Rules and
Arbitral Jurisdiction: When Party Intent is Not 'Clear and Unmistakable,' 17 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 545, 551-63 (2006).
46. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (parties may
by agreement limit scope of review of jurisdictional questions); Dell Computer Corp. v.
Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C) (arbitrators entitled to deference
in deciding their own jurisdiction); Dancap Prods. Inc. v. Key Brand Entm't Inc., 2009
ONCA 135 (Ont. C.A.) (scope of arbitration agreement for the arbitrators); see also
MOSES, supra note 1, at 90-91 ;William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options:
What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12 ARB. INT'L 137
(1996); William W. Park, Determining an Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: Timing and finality
in American Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 135, 144-45 (2007) [hereinafter Determining Jurisdiction]
(comparing German and American law on finality of arbitrators' jurisdictional rulings
when requested to decide consent issues by the parties); Alan Scott Rau, "The
Arbitrability Question Itself," 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 289-302 (1999) (further
analysis of First Options).
47. The severability principle-the doctrine that the arbitration clause is, in law,
autonomous from the contract in which it is embedded-has generated much debate, in
part because it depends on legal fiction to sustain itself (at least in some circumstances).
See JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES

AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 132-33 (1997) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES &
PRACTICE]; see also infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to
eliminate severability for certain contracts). The doctrine's reception into mainstream
arbitration jurisprudence is helpfully traced in Hulbert, supra note 45, at 551-63.
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that fundamental inquiry may be entrusted to the arbitrators to perform
with relative conclusiveness, it is the review of that question by the
courts that prevents arbitral jurisdiction from degenerating into a
grotesque legal fiction.48 Given that arbitral jurisdiction is a function of
consent, the scope question arguably is as fundamental as its existence;
taken together the two questions determine what, if anything, the parties
agreed to arbitrate.
The scope question tends, however, to be associated with delicate
rules of construction sometimes bordering on tenuous legalisms.
American courts for instance generally consider the expression "all
disputes arising out of a contract" to be a narrower submission than one
consenting to arbitrate "all disputes related to" the contract. 49 The exact
words used matter despite the Moses Cone presumption under which
doubts about the scope of the arbitration clause must be "resolved in
favor of arbitration." 50
The House of Lords 51 has recently acknowledged that little can
defensibly be inferred from slight differences among certain scope
formulae known to English law. In particular, should the question of
contract rescission for alleged illegality be kept from the arbitrators
because the arbitration clause in question entrusted to them only disputes
"arising under" the contract? However elusive the phrasing distinctions
may seem to an outsider, the argument was not completely fanciful under
English precedent.52 Whatever its origins, the potential for such shading
to dictate the scope of arbitral jurisdiction "reflected no credit upon

48. See Park, DeterminingJurisdiction,supra note 46, at 140.
49. Compare Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464
(9th Cir. 1983) (any dispute "arising hereunder" did not catch fraud in the inducement
claims), and Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1513-17 (9th Cir.
1983) (any dispute "arising in connection with" the contract caught antitrust claims
having a reasonable factual connection to it).
50. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (FAA establishes that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction
of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability"); First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45 (1995) (citing with approval but
distinguishing its Moses Cone decision); Finegold v. Setty & Assocs., Ltd., 81 F.3d 206,
208 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 720 (1999) (relying on
the Moses Cone presumption to construe "arising in connection with" broadly).
51. Premium Nafta Products Ltd., & Others v. Fili Shipping Co., Ltd., & others
(Fiona Trust & Holding Corp., & others v. Yuri Privalov & Others), [2007] UKHL 40
(U.K.).
52. Some of the phrasing variations said to be meaningful under former English case
law must certainly have posed traps for the unwary, whose reliance on plain meaning
might lead them astray. See DAVID SUTTON & JUDITH GILL, RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION
59-60 (2d ed. 2003) ("The words 'arising out of contract' have been said to have a wider
meaning than 'arising under a contract."').
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English commercial law ' 53 and warranted a "fresh start" 54-one that
would accord more feasibly with the parties' likely intentions. Thus:
[T]he construction of an arbitration clause should start from the
assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to
have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which
they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same
tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with this
presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions
55
were intended to be excluded from the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
When consulting Professor Moses's book, one learns more about the
international regime superimposed upon domestic systems than about
nuances of individual national systems. The book covers, for instance,
the formal requirements attaching to the agreement to arbitrate under the
New York Convention-notably that it be embodied in a writing. 56 As
Professor Moses explains, that predicate is narrowly described in the
New York Convention's fifty-year old formula, promoting among courts
some ingenuity in giving effect to agreements to arbitrate that may
comport with modem trade usage but which may not strictly speaking be
"an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. 57 As she
notes, some relief has come in the form of UNCITRAL
recommendations, 58 issued in 2006, that suggest (if elliptically) that an
agreement to arbitrate falling under the Convention should be enforced if
it satisfies what will often be the more liberal writing requirements of
53. Premium Nafta, UKHL 40, at 12.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 13. Applied to the case at hand, the "arising under" language caught the
claim for rescission. Id. The "fresh start" decreed by the Lords would seem to make
English law less concerned with the phrasing of clauses than U.S. law, which still makes
distinctions. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. The decision's other principal
holding was that credible claims of illegality addressed to the underlying contract do not
undermine the effectiveness of the arbitration clause embedded therein, which by virtue
of its legal autonomy survives to provide arbitral jurisdiction. Premium Nafta, UKHL 40.
The decision confirms an interpretation of the 1996 Act that corresponds rather closely
with that announced by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v.
Cardegna,in which the Court ruled that the operation of the severability principle did not
depend upon whether the attack on the main contract rendered it void or merely voidable.
546 U.S. 440, 447-48 (2006).
56. MOSES, supra note 1, at 19-24 (discussing New York Convention, art. 11(2)).
57. Id.
58. See Recommendation regarding the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and
Article VII, Paragraph 1,of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, done in New York, 10 June 1958, adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006 at its thirty-ninth
session, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/
A2E.pdf.
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the domestic arbitration law.59 In a contemporaneous development,
UNCITRAL has amended its Model Law to either (at the election of the
adopting state) prescribe no writing requirement, or a relatively liberal
one that accounts for both electronic communications and such
established trade practices as the oral incorporation of written trade
terms.6 °
The treatment of award "set aside" (roughly synonymous with
"annulment" or "vacatur") and award enforcement occur in the book's
Chapters nine and ten respectively. 6' Within the international treaty
framework serving arbitration, the two questions are linked. An award
that has been set aside by a competent court need not be enforced abroad
under either the Panama or the New York Convention,6 2 though much
intellectual skill and energy has been devoted to the related question:
when, if at all, should an award that has been annulled nevertheless be
enforced? 63 As Professor Moses reminds us, the power to set aside an
award is traditionally vested exclusively in the courts at the seat of
arbitration (which American courts refer to as those having "primary
jurisdiction").64 By contrast, a court refusing enforcement under a
convention is not denaturing the award, but merely exerting a form of
secondary control available to the court under the New York
Convention.6 5 Though refused recognition in one country, the award
may be enforced elsewhere.
In combination, Chapters nine and ten do reveal an important
congruency between set aside law and refusal practice under a
convention; in neither context are awards ordinarily reviewed on the
merits, at least under approaches prevailing in legal systems favorably
associated with international arbitration.66 The English exception to this
pattern is narrow, so that there, as elsewhere, award effectiveness
depends modernly not on whether the court addressed would have

59. MOSES, supra note 1, at 19-24 (discussing New York Convention, art. II(2)).
60. MOSES, supra note 1, at 24-26.
61. Types of awards-final, partial, interim, consent and default-are surveyed in
Chapter 8 of the book as are the award's preclusive effects.
62. 50 Years, supra note 6, at art. V(1)(e).
63. See MOSES, supra note 1, at 214-16; Jan Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral Awards
Notwithstanding a Local StandardAnnulment (LSA), 9(1) ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BuLL. 14
(1998); Christopher Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated InternationalArbitration Awards: An
Economic Approach, 11 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 451 (2000).
64. See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
65. MOSES, supra note 1, at 213.
66. Id. at 196-97.
67. See id.
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reached the same result, 68 but on whether the tribunal had jurisdiction,
stayed within that jurisdiction, 69 and accorded suitable levels of
procedural fairness to the participants.7 ° In the United States, the
Supreme Court has recently reinforced this expectation by ruling in its
Hall Street decision that the statutory bases for vacatur found in the FAA
are exclusive, 71 thus precluding merits review by party agreement 72 and,
by seemingly clear implication, disallowing as a separate basis for
vacatur "manifest disregard of the law." The latter idiosyncratic doctrine
of American law has been invoked frequently but without regular
success. It was born of dictum in a case long ago vacated, and applied
with variations among the different U.S. circuits, some of which continue
to intone it after Hall Street.73
While mention is made above of the Panama Convention,74
Professor Moses is correct to emphasize the New York Convention,75
which in its fiftieth year is of singular importance. Easily the most
important among the arbitration treaties, 76 the New York Convention has
68.

See generally William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards, in LAW OF

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LIBER
AMICORUM KARL HEINZ BOCHSTIEGEL 595 (2001).

69. Excess of mandate, though variously described, is a common ground for
annulment. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 10, art. 34(a)(iii) ("the award
deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the [agreement
to arbitrate]").
70. See generally L. Yves Fortier, The Minimum Requirements of Due Process in
Taking Measures Against Dilatory Tactics: Arbitral Discretion in International
Commercial Arbitration-"A Few Plain Rules and a Few Strong Instincts," in
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF
APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 396 (A. van den Berg ed., 1998).
71. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008).
72. Id. at 1409. For discussion of the pre-Hall jurisdictional splits on the question of
expanded review by agreement, see MOSES, supra note 1, at 197-98 (noting grant of cert.
by the Court); for a recent assessment, see Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 469 (2006). See generally PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS DISPUTES, supra note 37, at 18-20.
73. Those believing that Hall Street would put an end to overt merits review have
been proven wrong. Courts have found room to maneuver notwithstanding Hall Street.
See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int'l, 548 F.3d 85, 101 (2d Cir. 2008) (manifest
disregard subsumed, and thus available under, FAA Section 10(a)(4) (excess of arbitral
powers)); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW L.L.C., 300 Fed. App'x 415, 418-419 (6th Cir.
2008) (Hall Street showed reluctance to prohibit manifest disregard in all circumstances
as a basis of vacatur); Cable Connection v. Direct TV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 599 (Cal.
2008) (under state arbitration statute, parties may agree to merits review; FAA as
construed in Hall Street not preemptive).
74. See MOSES, supra note 1, at 8.
75. A leading reference on the Convention, even with the passage of time, is ALBERT
JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 50 (1981).
76. For a thoughtful argument that the Panama Convention adds little of value to the
New York Convention regime, see Claus von Wobeser, The Influence of the New York
Convention in Latin America and on the Inter-American Convention on International
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largely succeeded in promoting globally the enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate and of arbitral awards. Though some have argued that
77
revisions are called for, or that supporting institutions could add value,
the Convention remains a workable mix of obligations and exceptions.
What might not have been expected in 1958 is the extent to which the
exceptions, especially with respect to award enforcement, would be read
narrowly by courts. 78 This self-restraint is particularly impressive given
that public policy is among the enumerated grounds for refusing
enforcement.79 Professor Moses's book conveys this general sense well,
while supplying details about the individual Article V exceptions to a
state's undertakings to recognize and to enforce arbitral awards. 80

Commercial Arbitration, 2 DIsP. RESOL. INT'L 43 (2008) (suggesting the Panama
Convention should be terminated).
77. Howard M. Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New
InternationalCourt for Resolving Disputes on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 109 (Martin Hunter et al.
eds., 1995) (proposing creation of an international court for enforcement and set aside of
arbitration awards); H.E. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, The Creation and Operationof an
InternationalCourt of Arbitral Awards, in id. at 115, (discussing treaty implementation
of Judge Holtzmann's proposal).
78. See Gerald Aksen & Wendy Dorman, Application of the New York Convention
by United States Courts: A Twenty-Year Review (1970-1990), 2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 65,
81-86 (1991); Pieter Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269 (1979);
Albert Jan van den Berg, "Refusals of Enforcement under the New York Convention of
1958: The Unfortunate Few," in ARBITRATION IN THE NEXT DECADE, ICC INT'L CT. ARB.
BULL. SPEC. SuPP., at 86 (1999); Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Convention of 1958:
Refusals of Enforcement, 18(2) ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 1 (2007).
79. The overwhelming trend among modem systems with respect to Convention
awards is to conceive of public policy quite narrowly. See, e.g., V.V. Veeder, The New
York Convention in Common Law Countries-andin the European Union, in THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 117, 126 (1996) (Conference Proceedings) ("To my
knowledge, no English Court has ever refused to enforce or recognize a foreign
arbitration award on the ground of public policy. Under English law generally, public
policy is a narrow ground of defence ....). The doctrinal distinction customarily
made-particularly among civil law authorities-is that "domestic" public policy must be
distinguished from the more exceptional and compelling "international" public policy
("ordre public intemationale"); only the latter should hold sway under the Convention.
See generally International Law Association, Committee on International Commercial
Arbitration, Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International
Arbitration Awards (2000)(on file with author); ILA, Report With Recommendations on
Public Policy, REPORT OF THE 70TH ILA CONFERENCE 16, 352 (2002); cf Karl H.
Bockstiegel, Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement, in 50 Years,
supra note 6, at 129, 130 (in case of doubt award enforceable; exceptions include if
enforcement would equate to criminal activity or would further terrorism, drug
trafficking, money laundering, smuggling or genocide).
80. See MOSES, supra note 1,at 202-19.
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D. Reform-Problems and Prospects
Newcomers to the field of ICA may conclude that whatever ICA's
pedigree, its legitimacy issues seemingly have not been fully resolved.
As with commercial arbitration in general, the system, after all, continues
to rely on party-appointed "wing" arbitrators, who, while charged with
independence and impartiality, are often appointed after an ex parte
interview, 81 and may be compensated directly by the appointing party. 2
The apologist's reply to this incomplete depiction is that the duty to be
and remain independent and impartial (the international standard) is not
solely self-policing, but rather is regulated by several loosely interconnected regime features tending to foster observance of neutrality
standards and to detect violations thereof. These include limits imposed
on the scope of pre-appointment interviews, the requirement that an
arbitrator disclose potential conflicts,8 3 the ability of a party to challenge
an arbitrator upon discovery of troubling facts,84 the operation of certain
85
intra-tribunal policing mechanisms, and court controls both at the place
of arbitration (in 8the
form of set aside proceedings) and under the New
6
York Convention.

A thoroughgoing critique concerned with systemic transparency
might also take note of the privacy that is touted by some as one of
arbitration's virtues. ICA continues to be characterized by private
81. See generally Gavin Griffith, Constitution of Arbitral Tribunals: The Duty of
Impartiality in Tribunals or Choose Your Arbitrator Wisely, 13 ICSID REV. 36 (1998);
Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies:
Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59 (1995).
82. See generally D. Bishop & L. Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing,
Selecting, and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial
Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 395 (1998); James Carter, Living with the Party-Appointed
Arbitrator: Judicial Confusion, Ethical Codes and PracticalAdvice, 3 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 153 (1992). The interview process is regulated by rules that, inter alia, prohibit
discussions of the merits during the interview process; permissible topics include the
arbitrator's availability, linguistic abilities, and apparent conflicts. See Ben Sheppard, A
New Era of Arbitrator Ethicsfor the United States: The 2004 Revision to the AAA/ABA
Code of EthicsforArbitratorsin CommercialDisputes, 21 ARB. INT'L 91, 95-97 (2005).
83. Leading guides addressing disclosure are ABA, Code of Ethicsfor Arbitrators
in Commercial Disputes Canon II (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
dispute/commercial-disputes.pdf, and IBA, Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
InternationalArbitration (2004), availableat www.ibanet.org; see also IBA, Background
Information on the IBA Guidelines on the Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration, availableat www.ibanet.org/pdf/InternationalArbitration Guidelines.pdf.
84. See Barton Legum, Investor-State Arbitrator Disqualifiedfor Pre-Appointment
Statements on Challenged Measures, 21 ARB. INT'L. 241 (2005).
85. A party appointed arbitrator who exhibits partiality will often come to be viewed
guardedly by the other two arbitrators, and will lose influence as a result.
86. See, e.g., New Regency Prod. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101(9th
Cir. 2007) (award properly set aside where arbitrator failed to disclose post-appointment
conflict resulting from change of employer).
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proceedings,8 7 non-systematic access to awards,88 and the possibility in
some jurisdictions that awards will be issued without an elaboration of
reasons. 89 These process features admittedly reduce ICA's transparency
quotient, 9° but they are offset, if only in part, by several factors. First,
the types of arbitrations most obviously redolent of the public interestinvestor state arbitrations-have become remarkably transparent through
a more predictable access to such awards (almost invariably reasoned), 91
a trend toward open hearings,92 and occasional access by amici to the
proceedings in the discretion of the tribunal.93 Second, with respect to
private commercial arbitration, the default provision in most
international rule formulae is that awards are to be reasoned, 94 and
though they remain only episodically available, institutions have
increasingly published redacted extracts of tribunal reasoning in various
forms. What is more, a dissenting arbitrator ordinarily will be entitled to
87. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, for instance, provide that oral hearings shall
be held in camera unless the parties otherwise agree. Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law, supra note 17, Rule 25(4).
88. Awards are not invariably circulated in the public domain. See, e.g., Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, supra note 17, art.
32(5) ("the award may be made public only with the consent of both parties"). Strictu
sensu, no formal system of precedent operates in ICA; awards bind only the disputing
parties and only as to the dispute submitted. In some sectors, however, notably investorstate arbitration, awards are entering the public domain with relative predictability. In
that sector and others, despite the absence of formal precedent it has become obvious that
when such materials are available, tribunals and advocates acquaint themselves with the
reasoning and outcomes produced by other arbitrations. The NAFTA awards contain
particularly good examples of this explicit cross-referencing. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking
Stock of NAFTA ChapterEleven in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes,
Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1409 (2003) [hereinafter Taking
Stock]; cf Martin Hunter, Publicationof Awards and Lex Mercatoria,54 ARB. 55 (1998)
(Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal awards valuable to scholars and students); see also PARK,
ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES, supra note 37, at 383 (discussing,

generally, the benefits of publishing awards).
89. Unreasoned awards are enforceable in the United States. See PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE, supra note 47, at 35 (1997).

90.

See UNCTAD, A Review, infra note 112, at 56; V.V. Veeder, The Transparency

of International Arbitration: Process and Substance, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 88 (Loukas Mistelis & Julian Lew eds., 2006); Jack J. Coe,

Jr., Secrecy and Transparency in Dispute Resolution: Transparency in the Resolution of
Investor-State Disputes-Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 KAN. L. REV.
1339 (2006) [hereinafter NAFTA Leadership]; cf Jack J. Coe, Jr., The Transparency
Features of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in THE IRAN U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 25

(Oxford Univ. Press, 2007) (discussing antecedents to the present investor-state
transparency initiatives).
91. Many examples are present on line; e.g., http://www.investmentclaims.com/.
92. See NAFTA Leadership,supra note 90, at 1360-62.
93. Id. at 1362-78.
94. See, e.g., Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, supra note 17, art. 32(3) (award shall state reasons upon which it is based
unless the parties agree otherwise).
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issue a dissenting opinion, by which vehicle weaknesses in the majority's
reasoning may be identified (thus promoting deliberateness and care in
reasoning and drafting on the part of the majority).9 5 Third, many
awards enter the public domain because they are the subject of postaward court proceedings, typical of vacatur and enforcement actions.
A search of the literature will reveal that, not all have stopped
questioning the wisdom of entrusting public law claims to arbitrators,96
but it is only a narrow form of these sensibilities that has taken a foothold among U.S. lawmakers and the reform-minded. In the United
States, the scope of the FAA has been construed broadly, and its
muscular pro-arbitration policies in principle apply with equal force to
transactions and contracts involving consumers, employment, domestic
commerce, and international commerce. Thus, unlike other jurisdictions
that may for instance require post-dispute consent when a consumer
transaction is involved, 97 the United States leaves to the law of
unconscionability the principal role in policing unfair arbitration
agreements. 98 This entrusting of bargaining issues chiefly to the general
state law of contract may come to an end in the near future in favor of
supplementing federal legislation designed to operate with less nuance.
Of late, Congress has shown a sustained interest in initiatives
designed to limit party autonomy and to secure for courts a greater role
in supervising the quality of the consent that empowers arbitrators in
certain kinds of cases. The proposed cure, however, may be worse than
the malady. 99
Lawmakers who are troubled by enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses against consumers, franchisees, employees, and
95. PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE, supra note 47, at 295. Despite the mandate that
arbitrators be impartial and independent, published sources (admittedly a small sample)
suggest that when a dissent issues it will ordinarily be to address a point upon which that
arbitrator's appointing party lost. At the same time there are many more examples of
unanimous awards.
96. MOSES, supra note 1, at 217 (citing Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and
Virtues of Lawlessness: A 'Second Look' at International Commercial Arbitration, 93

Nw. U. L. REV 453,481 (1999)).
97. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer
Arbitration in the European Union and the UnitedStates, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG

357 (2002); Jean R. Stemlight, Is the US Out on a Limb? Comparingthe U.S. Approach
to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56
U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002).

98. The standard two-part inquiry applied in dozens of cases is exemplified by AlSafin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering both
"procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability).
99. See generally Thomas Carbonneau, "Arbitracide": The Story ofAnti-Arbitration
Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 233 (2007); Alan Kaplinsky &
Mark Levin, Consumer Arbitration: If the FAA "Ain't Broke, " Don't Fix It, 63 BUS.
LAW. 907 (2008).
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similar classes of market participants tend to fear that arbitration is
structured by stronger, repeat-players, is to a large extent "nonnegotiable," and removes from the non-drafting party important rights
and protections (such as access to class actions, and juries and decisionmakers bound to apply the law who can be counted upon as impartial).' 00
Such concerns persist although empirical studies do not fully support the
underlying assumptions at work.' 0'
However valid the basis for reform might be with respect to
contracts of adhesion affecting certain weaker classes of market
participants, 1° one would expect carve-outs in legislative reactions to the
problem to insulate commercial arbitration from overly inclusive reform.
In the international setting in particular, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements and the associated doctrines of severability and KompetenzKompetenz solve a cluster of problems that would otherwise burden
commerce with considerable uncertainty in the management of disputes.
Yet, two of the more influential draft "fairness" enactments do not
distinguish between international and domestic arbitration, nor between
consumer-business and business-to-business disputes. °3
Consider for the sake of illustration the Feingold variant of the
several proposals under consideration, and its treatment of severability:
[T]he validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate shall be
determined by a court, under federal law, rather than an arbitrator,
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the
arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction
with other terms
10 4
of the contract containing such agreement.
This assault on the severability principle is particularly ironic, since
06
05
the United States Supreme Court' and the English House of Lords'
100. See Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 99, at 908-09.
101. See id. at 909-11 (relying on several studies); cf Stephen J. Ware, The Casefor
Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-With Particular Consideration of Class
Actions andArbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254-264 (2006) (arguing that enforcing
pre-dispute arbitration agreements produces indirect benefits to consumers and thus can
be justified on that basis).
102. See supra note 97; Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through
Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J.ON DisP. RESOL. 627 (2008).
103. See Mark L. Kantor, Update: Legislative Proposals Could Significantly Alter
Arbitration in the United States, in ARB. (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Newsletter),
Nov. 2008.
104. U.S. Congressional Research Service, Official Summary, Arbitration Fairness
Act, S. 1782 and H.R. 3010 (CRS summary as excerpted in Kantor, supra note 103).
105. See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)
(finding that an arbitration clause is severable and unless effectively challenged
specifically, a dispute is to be referred to the arbitrators who are then entitled to rule on
the validity of the main contract and render an award accordingly; Florida Supreme Court
erred in distinguishing between void and voidable contracts, the application of the
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each recently endorsed robust versions of the principle by preserving the
enforceability of arbitration clauses embedded in allegedly unlawful
contracts. The failure to insulate international commercial arbitration is
not an oversight, and the price paid in overruling the severability
principle and certain other draft provisions will likely be the diversion of
a certain percentage of otherwise U.S.-bound international arbitrations to
seats abroad. There may also be an incentive for certain litigants to sue
in a U.S. court when the objective is to evade an arbitration clause by
attacking the underlying contract's validity. That the U.S. Supreme
Court has long sought to discourage that result is evident from its Prima
Paint decision 10 7 and decades of subsequent case law redoubling the
point.
E. Investor-State Arbitration
Ten years ago one might have questioned Professor Moses's
decision to allocate twenty pages to investor-state arbitration. In 2008,
however, there can be little question that the topic had become
sufficiently important to include in a book devoted to "commercial"
arbitration.
As evident from the ICSID' 0 8 docket which lists
approximately 270 cases (pending and concluded combined), 10 9 investorstate disputes now place in controversy billions of dollars." 0
Augmenting the ICSID list of proceedings are an unknown but probably
comparable number of claims brought under non-ICSID regimes such as
the UNCITRAL Rules."' The flood of cases has been promoted by an
severability principle being the same in either case). For thoughtful case-notes on
Buckeye, see Ben H. Sheppard, Jr., The Moth, the Light and the United States'
Severability Doctrine, 23(5) J. INT'L ARB. 479 (2006); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration
Law's Separability DoctrineAfter Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEv. L.J.
107 (2007).
106. See Premium Nafta Products Ltd., & Others v. Fili Shipping Co., Ltd., & others
(Fiona Trust & Holding Corp., & others v. Yuri Privalov & Others), [2007] UKHL 40
(U.K.).
107. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
108. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dispute between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The leading commentary on the ICSID Convention is
CHRISTOPH H.

SCHREUER,

THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001).

The

literature addressing it is extensive. See id. at 1291-1329 (bibliography); see also
CHARLES H. BROWER, II, ET AL., NAFTA CHAPTER ELEVEN REPORTS 683-700 (2005)
(Chapter Eleven bibliography).
109. See List of ICSID Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ (follow the "Cases"
hyperlink; then follow the "List of Cases" hyperlink).
110. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1, 57-64 (2007).
111. See United Nations Commission On International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-
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unprecedented number of pre-dispute consents to arbitration found
primarily in the many hundreds of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
now extant."12 By prefiguring en masse direct access to an arbitral
remedy for aggrieved investors, modem BITs readily can generate
dozens of potential claims when sector-wide and country-wide
3
disruptions affect foreign investors."
That Professor Moses treats investor-state cases in a separate
chapter is logical in light of their distinctive features. 1 4 In such
proceedings, public and private international law intersect in numerous
ways within a basic procedural structure borrowed from international
commercial arbitration," 15 making for distinctive questions of
jurisdiction 1 6 and challenging issues of substantive law."' Given the
often novel and complex character of these proceedings, Professor Moses
18
might be applauded for accomplishing the task in twenty pages.'
rules/arb-rules.pdf. Many BITs give claimants the option of proceeding without an
institution under the UNCITRAL Rules.
112. See generally UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment
Treaties: A Review (2005) [hereinafter A Review] ("[S]ince the 1990's the number of
cases has grown enormously.") (report on file with the author); RUDOLPH DOLZER &
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); KENNETH VANDEVELDE,

UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992); Antonio R. Parra,

Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws,
BilateralInvestment Treaties and MultilateralInstruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV.
287 (1997).
113. See R. Doak Bishop & Roberto Aguirre Luzi, Investment Claims: FirstLessons
from Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM ICSID,
NAFTA, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 425,

435-69
114.
having
sought

(T. Weiler ed., 2005).
The admiration I have for the book, which is considerable, comes in part from
produced a similar reference. My now out-of-print volume published in 1997
roughly the same audience as Professor Moses' book, and covered much of the

same ground. See PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE, supra note 47.

115. See generally Barton Legum, The Innovation of NAFTA Investor-State
Arbitration, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 531 (2002) (tracing mixed claims processes historically).
116. Jack J. Coe, Jr., The Mandate of Chapter 11 Tribunals-Jurisdictionand Related
Questions, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT
PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 215 (T. Weiler ed., 2004).

117. Charles H. Brower, II et al., Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's
Investment Chapter, Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American
Society of InternationalLaw, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L PROC. 9, 19 (2002) (hereinafter ASIL
Proceedings); L. Yves Fortier & Stephen Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of
InternationalInvestment: I Know it When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID REV.
293 (2004); J. Christopher Thomas, Reflections on Article 1105 of the NAFTA: History
State Practice and the Influence of Commentators, 17 ICSID REV. 21, 98-101 (2002); see
also UNCTAD, A Review, supra note 112, at 1 (vagueness of some treaty guarantees
adds unpredictability).
118. More comprehensive treatments include R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY (2005); CAMPBELL
MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE, & MATTHEW WEINGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (2007).

1390
III.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

MINOR QUIBBLES AND FRIENDLY AMENDMENTS

In the main, Professor Moses's book is written with clarity,
accessibility and authoritativeness. Its documentary appendices have
been well selected. The table of contents and detailed index make the
information physically accessible, and the authorities Professor Moses

relies upon are balanced, varied, and substantial. As the following brief
litany of observations will demonstrate, my quibbles with the work are

truly minor in comparison to the admiration I have for it." 9
For instance, one hoping for an extensive exploration of non-arbitral
ADR and how it might mesh with arbitration will be left wanting more in
Professor Moses's book. As the title suggests, of course, the book is

about arbitration. Professor Moses does provide a starting place by short
paragraphs defining mediation and conciliation (though unconvincingly
suggesting the two are different processes in practice)12 ° and alerts the

reader also to the prevalence of clauses calling for mediation before
arbitration (often called "step" or "med-arb" clauses). The literature
concerning various blends of mediation and arbitration is rich, however,
so that the introductory treatment found in the book can readily be

supplemented.12 1
While I would have liked to find in her book a table of cases and a

bibliography, the footnotes provide the researcher a good point of entry,
and the table of useful website addresses she assembled was a pleasant
surprise-and very useful. Additionally, some practitioners and scholars
might find the in-laid box technique for surrounding the verbatim

119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. Even if technical differences between the two processes could be agreed upon,
an agreement not found in the literature, in practice the two methods merge; ordinarily,
little turns on any supposed distinctions. Accordingly, Burhing-Uhle uses the two terms
interchangeably for purposes of his book. Either term was to refer to "the non-binding
intervention by a neutral third party who helps the disputants negotiate an agreement."
CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
273 (lst ed. 1996). The same approach is adopted in HENRY BROWN & ARTHUR
MARRIOTT, ADR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 127 (2d ed. 1999), and in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE, supra note 47.
121. For a sampling of representative discussion, see BUHRING-UHLE, supra note 120;

Jack. J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-States
Disputes-A PreliminarySketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L LAW & POL'y 7 (2005); Michael
Collins, Do International Arbitral Tribunals have any Obligations to Encourage
Settlement of the Dispute before Them?, 19 ARB. INT'L. 333 (2003); Ellen E. Deason,
ProceduralRules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation- Worldwide,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553 (2005); Robert Dobbins, The Layered Dispute Resolution
Clause From Boilerplate to Business Opportunity, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 161 (2000);
Haig Oghigian, Arbitrators Acting as Mediators, 68 ARB. 42 (2002); James T. Peter,
Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 83 (1997);

Jeswald

Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty -Based, Investor-State
Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 138 (2007).
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observations of well-known arbitrators and counsel to be, at first blush,
digressive. Though it is a technique not often used in law texts, it
succeeds in separating the author's words from her sources' comments,
and I suspect that students and many others will appreciate the glimpse
into the minds of some of the personalities in the field. Most readers
upon modest reflection should realize that the quotes both add charm and
convey information not found elsewhere-sometimes of a kind for122which
one would pay a substantial sum at an arbitrator training seminar.
The substantive deficiencies one might identify are trivial and
arguable. For instance, a technician might have paused at the following
statement 23 found under the heading "Place of Hearing":
The place of the hearing is normally determined in the arbitration
clause, but if not, the arbitrators will choose a seat, usually one that is
neutral in the sense of not being in the country of either party. Once
the seat is chosen, the tribunal can, on occasion decide to hold
meetings elsewhere, without changing the legal situs of the
arbitration.
The first sentence is troubling because it invites one to conflate the place
of hearing and the place of arbitration. The latter, which is variously
referred to as the "seat," "the situs," or "the place," when used in its
technical, non-geographic sense is a term carrying both jurisdictional and
governing law implications. It is to the courts of that place to which a
dissatisfied party must turn to seek annulment of the award, a petition
that will be adjudicated using the substantive arbitration law of that place
(at least in the vast majority of cases). It is that place that will give the
award its national affiliation for purposes of the New York Convention's
reciprocity provisions and the award will be deemed made at that place
(no matter where the arbitrators deliberated, or signed the award).
24
Professor Moses makes these essential points elsewhere in the book. 1
Because of the central importance of the place of arbitration, the
standard clauses sponsored by institutions typically invite the parties to
designate the place of arbitration in their arbitration provision (a practice
exemplified by the many standard clauses found in the book's Appendix
I). By contrast, rule formulae do not suggest designating a place of
hearing. Hearings may well be held at the place of arbitration, but, as
Professor Moses notes, they need not be. Indeed, there are examples of
arbitrations in which none of the hearings were held at the place of

122.

A good example is a pre-conference agenda letter used by arbitrator David

Wagoner. See MOSES supra note 1, at 154-56.

123. Id. at 161.
124. Id. at 43.
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arbitration, and yet the award was not questioned on that basis. 125 No
doubt the parties may attempt to limit the tribunal's discretion by
of hearing in the clause, but that practice is
designating exclusive places
26
not particularly common.1

Another opportunity for clarification-or at least amplification-is
found in the investor-state chapter. In discussing ICSID's Additional
Facility, Professor Moses writes: "[T]he major significance of the
inapplicability of the ICSID Convention is that the Convention's
provisions on recognition and enforcement do not apply. Rather, an
Additional Facility award, like an award under the ICC or LCIA, is
,,127
subject to enforcement under the New York Convention.
The distinction made is certainly important. Nevertheless, I would
have thought it equally useful to note that when rendered under the
Additional Facility and thus not governed by the ICSID Convention, the
128
award can be attacked in a set aside action at the place of arbitration and correspondingly that ICSID's internal control mechanism 129 is not
available, let alone exclusive. 130 This is particularly important because
the ICSID Convention, for want of ratifications by Mexico or Canada,
has never governed a NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration, a fact reflected
in several attempts to set aside Chapter Eleven awards in local courts.'31

125. See, e.g., United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (B.C. Sup. Ct.), availableat
(arbitration seated in
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes-mexicometalclad.htm
British Columbia but tribunal held all hearings in Washington D.C.).
126. There is room to consider me insufferably didactic on this point. Indeed,
Professor Moses has powerful company in her choice of words. Gerry Aksen, when he
was General Counsel to the American Arbitration Association, wrote: "Whenever
possible, the clause should designate where the arbitration hearing is to take place.
Experience has shown that one of the most common prearbitral disputes is over the situs
of the hearing itself." Geral Aksen, A Practical Guide to InternationalArbitration, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION PRIVATE
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 51 (1976).

INVESTORS

127. MOSES, supra note 1, at 228.
128. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards: Necessary Evil
or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA, 19(3) J. INT'L ARB. 185, 18586, 194-96 (2002) [hereinafter Achilles Heell.
129. See Aron Broches, Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards, 6 ICSID
REV.-FILJ 321 (1991); Michael W. Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control
Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739 (1989); Mark B. Feldman, The
Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, 2 ICSID REV.-FILJ
85 (1987); Andrea Giardina, ICSID: A Self-Contained, Non-National Review System, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND
UNIFORMITY? 199 (R. Lillich & C. Brower eds., 1994); Michael W. Reisman, Repairing
ICSID's Control System: Some Comments on Aron Broches' "Observations on the
Finality ofICSID Awards," 7 ICSID REV.-FILJ 196 (1992).
130. Achilles Heel, supra note 128, at 185-86.
131. See generally David Williams, Review and Recourse Against Awards Rendered
under Investment Treaties,4(2) J. WORLD INV. 251(2003); Achilles Heel, supra note 128.
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In limiting herself to a neutral presentation, and seeking balance in
her sources, Professor Moses leaves generous room for classroom
discussion. For example, she suggests:
[A]wards are so rarely refused enforcement on grounds of public
policy that some commentators have urged courts to reconsider
application of the public policy defense of Article V(2)(b) to make
more than a theoretical defense, and to apply it somewhat more
flexibly as a basis for refusing enforcement where enforcement
would condone unjust or improper results. 132
Supporting this observation, she quotes an article which observes: "The
equitable path for article V(2)(b) jurisprudence to take would be ... [to
preserve] a deferential stance toward arbitration while recognizing that
the court system need not condone the unjust results that are sometimes
reached in alternative dispute resolution."' 133 In a room full of
international arbitration specialists, a call for Article V(2)(b) to be used
to redress "unjust results" would give rise to considerable bristling.
Professor Moses in an adjacent section gets to the heart of the matter:
"Although a number of countries construe the public policy defense
narrowly, there is room for it to be used parochially to protect national
political interests. To the extent
that a country does this, it undermines
' 34
the utility of the Convention."'
The way to develop a sense of this debate in the classroom is to ask
how the Convention's success story might have been different if public
policy became a basis upon which courts could explore the merits in
dispute in order to assess the "justness" of an outcome. The question of
course has implications beyond the Convention since the Model Law,
and the arbitration jurisprudence of many non-Model Law states,
includes "public policy" as a ground for set aside.
IV. CONCLUSION

After teaching for twenty-five years, it is not difficult to imagine the
Friday phone call from a former student who has an opportunity to
transition from her firm's banking regulation department to its arbitration
group. The matter will be more fully discussed at a meeting with
partners on Monday. She asks: is it likely to be an intellectually
enriching move and how does one quickly prepare to discuss the field
with a measure of confidence?
132.

MOSES, supra note 1, at 229.

133. Eloise Henderson Bouzari, The Public Policy Exception to Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards: Implications for Post-NAFTA Jurisprudence, 30 TEX
INT'L L.J. 205, 217-18 (1995).

134.

MOSES, supra note 1, at 218.
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As to its substantive allure, and putting aside its singular real world
importance, ICA remains fascinating. Whether one emphasizes process
design, comparative law and procedure, or private international law, ICA
represents a rich admixture of distinctive problems, pragmatic solutions,
and recurrent policy issues. The level of advocacy encountered is high,
and the sophistication of one's judges (the arbitrators) is impressive.
As to the weekend, in trying to acquire an introductory perspective
or to refresh one's sense of the field, one would do well to consult
Professor Moses' book. It is an excellent reference for law students and
lawyers seeking exposure to the principal doctrines, regimes, institutions,
and issues that typify the field. No doubt, to devote a weekend to the
book in the above circumstances-and in many others-would represent
a weekend well spent.

